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EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE WORK PLACE UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination.' Its prevalence is due largely to women's lack of economic power in society.2 This is illustrated by the observation that, in most fields,
women have a lower job status than men.' This renders women
particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment.4 The economic and
psychological costs of sexual harassment are borne by the victims, by the employers, and by society as a whole.'
Common to most reported incidents of sexual harassment
"the perpetrators are male, the victims, female. Few women are
in a position to harass men sexually, since they do not control
men's employment destinies at work . . . ." Surveys indicate
that there are many reported incidents of sexual harassment on
the job. Many more incidents go unreported." According to a
1. Rossein, Sex Discrimination and the Sexually Charged Work Environment, 9
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271 (1979-80). Rossein notes that "[t]he origins of sexual
abuse in the work place and the reasons for its tacit acceptance must be viewed in light
of women's subordinate position in the labor force and the traditional relationship of
women to men in American society." Id. at 271. See also U.S. COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB: A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 8 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION].
2. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). See also Rossein, supra note 1.
3. C. MACKINNON, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Allegretti, Sexual Harassment of Female Employees by Non-Supervisory Co-Workers: A Theory of Liability, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 437, 438 (1982); Wacks &
Starr, The Sexual Shakedown in Perspective: Sexual Harassment in its Social & Legal
Context, 7 EMPL. REL. L.J. 567, 568-71 (1981). See also Bureau of National Affairs, Sexual Harassment and Labor Relations: A BNA Special Report 28 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as BNA Report]. "The cost of sexual harassment to the Federal Government between May 1978 and May 1980 is conservatively estimated to have been $189 million."
Id.
6. C. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 31.
7. See, e.g., "Widespread Sexual Harassment Found at Harvard," N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1983, at A7, col. 1; C. MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 25-55; M. MEYER, I. BERCHTOLD,
J. OESTRIECH & F. COLLINS, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT 4-16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as M.
MEYER]; COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 9; Baxter, Judicial and Administrative Protections Against Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 7 EMPL. REL. L.J. 586 (1981).
8. See supra note 7.
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survey which was completed in 1981, about 42% of all female
federal employees have reported some incident of sexual harassment.9 Another study found that 59% of the 1,495 women responding to a questionnaire experienced one or more incidents
of sexual harassment in their present place of employment.1"
These incidents have ranged from suggestive looks to coerced
sex.1" In a survey conducted by the Chicago Sun Times,1 2 eightytwo out of a total of eighty-four respondents reported that they
had been subjected to some form of sexual harassment. 3 In this
survey, 56% of the respondents who reported that they had
been subjected to some form of sexual harassment ignored the
harasser.14 These respondents reported that they did nothing because taking action was not the thing to do.15 Others reported
that they were too embarrassed to complain,16 or that they did
not comjlain out of fear of reprisals. 17 Twenty-one percent of
the individuals who did not complain left the organization." Of
those respondents who did experience some form of sexual har9. COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 9. See also Baxter, supra note 7. The study also
notes that 15% of male federal workers report experiencing some form of sexual harassment. Id. at 587.
10. M. MFYER, supra note 7, at 7-8. This study was conducted by the Sangamon
State University and the Illinois Task Force on Sexual Harassment in the Work Place.
In the study, a scientifically selected sample was used. Sixty-three percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that "sexual harassment is a serious problem for many
working women." Seventy-two percent agreed with the statement that "unwelcome male
attentions on the job are offensive." Id. at 7.
11. Id. Respondents were asked to report only those incidents of unwanted sexual
attention that made them feel humiliated or threatened. Fifty-two percent had been subjected to sexual remarks or teasing, 41% had been the target of suggestive looks or leers,
26% had experienced subtle sexual hints and pressure, 25% had been physically touched
or grabbed, 20% had been sexually propositioned, 14% had been repeatedly pressured to
engage in personal relationships, 9% reported other miscellaneous forms of unwanted
sexual attention, and 2% experienced some form of coercive sex. These figures total
more than 100% because most women reported several kinds of harassing experiences."
Id.
12. Id. at 193-98.
13. Id. Of those responding that they had experienced some form of sexual harassment in the office, 4 were male, 19 were female, and 59 were unidentified. Id. at 195.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 196.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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assment, 73% stated that they had been harassed by their
supervisor.'
A study conducted by the Harvard Business Review and
Redbook Magazine found that "[t]he perceived seriousness of
workplace sexual harassment is related to the employment status of the person making the advance."2 0 This survey also found
that sexual harassment on the job is generally perceived to be a
power issue.2"
Although some of these studies, lack scientific reliability,
sexual harassment in the work place clearly is a serious problem.
MacKinnon has noted that "the sexual harassment of working
women presents a closed system of social predation in which
powerlessness builds powerlessness. Feelings are a material reality of it. Working women are defined, and survive by defining
themselves, as sexually accessible and economically exploitable."2 2 Rossein, in his article Sex Discriminationand the Sexually Charged Work Environment," has reached a similar
conclusion:
Sexual harassment is thus both an occupational health
hazard and an economic barrier for women. It has operated to confine women to the traditionally "female" jobs.
Nevertheless, harassment is deeply rooted in our popular
culture, and the resistance to treating it seriously as a
substantive employment barrier for women remains
strong. This is so even though sexual harassment has a
pronounced impact on women workers' job effectiveness
and productivity, and thus deprives society of the additional contributions that women workers could provide.2 '
19. Id. at 197. Thirty-three percent reported that they were harassed by a superior
unrelated to them at work, 41% reported that the harassment came from a peer or colleague, 28% reported that it came from an agent of another organization, 37% stated
that the harassment came from someone in the company but not in the same department
and not a supervisor. Id. at 197-98.
20. BNA Report, supra note 5, at 29.
21. Id.
22. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 55. MacKinnon also notes that "[o]bjections to
sexual harassment at work is not a neopuritan moral protest against signs of attraction,
displays of affection, compliments, flirtation or touching on the job. . . .Women who
protest sexual harassment at work are resisting economically enforced sexual exploitation." Id. at 25.
23. Rossein, supra note 1.
24. Id. at 278.
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Pepper and Kennedy have described the problem of sexual harassment in the work place in a more radical manner:
[S]exual harassment of female employees must be viewed
as yet one more manifestation of a social system in which
the women have been kept sexually subservient to men,
and at the bottom of the labor pool. The complementing
reality of dominant,male sexuality and the employer's
control over the work lives of his employees have
throughout history operated to compel women to exchange sexual services for material advancement, or perhaps even subsistence . .. In fact, such treatment of
women at work is an integral part of the social context in
which women control a vastly disproportionately small
share of wealth and power when compared with their
male counterparts. 5
Sexual harassment is unlike other areas of employment discrimination because it is emotional in nature.2 6 Sexual harassment is also unlike other areas of employment discrimination
because it is "basically a moral issue and therefore the overall
responsibility for its elimination lies with the individual rather
than with the law."'27 This idea is important because the legal
system can compensate victims of sexual harassment only after
the injuries have been sustained. To eliminate sexual harassment on the job, harassment must be dealt with in its larger
socio-economic context.
This note traces the evolution of employer liability for sexual harassment in the work place under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

To determine the scope of employer liability for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, one must begin
by determining what types of conduct constitute sexual
harassment.
Several comprehensive definitions of sexual harassment
25.

W. PEPPER AND F. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 36 (1981).

26. BNA Report, supra note 5, at 21.
27. M. MEYER, supra note 7, at 79.
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have been expounded. MacKinnon defines sexual harassment as
"the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context
of a relationship of unequal power.

' 28

MacKinnon also states

that "[s]exual harassment may occur as a single encounter or a
series of incidents at work. It may place a sexual condition upon
employment.

. .

or advancement; or it may occur as a pervasive

or continuing condition of the work environment. 2' 9 The United
States Commission on Human Rights defines sexual harassment
as "any unwanted attention of a sexuanature that occurs in the
process of working or seeking work and jeopardizes a person's
ability to earn a living. .

.

. Harassment ranges from annoying

and distracting comments to intimidation, threats and demands
to physical acts involving sexual conduct." 30
Despite these attempts to define' sexual harassment, determining what conduct actually constitutes sexual harassment
often must be done on a case-by-case basis. 3 1 Sexual harassment

is subjective in nature. What constitutes sexual harassment to
one individual may be considered an innocent flirtation to another. Meyer notes that:
Women appear to be quicker to expand the definition of
sexual harassment from the most obvious, job threatening harassment, to harassment in its other, frequently
more subtle forms. .

.

. Men, on the other hand, have

not thought a great deal about sexual harassment because society-males and females-has supported their
system of interacting with women. 2
Meyer also notes that many women object to "being touched by
the boss, addressed as 'honey' or dearie, being complimented
about their clothing after he's looked them carefully up and
down, being put in the position where they must listen to talk
about a wife who does not understand him

such conduct as sexual harassment.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

C. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 2.
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 7.
See, e.g., M. MEYER, supra note 7.
Id. at 38.
Id.

' 33

and categorize
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The E.E.O.C. Guidelines3 4 provide a comprehensive definition of sexual harassment. The Guidelines state that:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. 5
The Guidelines require that the totality of circumstances be examined before determining whether specific conduct constitutes
sexual harassment. Such circumstances include "the nature of
the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 36
III.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND TITLE

VII:

THE CASE LAW

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in pertinent part,
provides that "[iut shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to

. .

. discriminate against any individual with re-

spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 7

The case law today has clearly established that most forms
of sexual harassment are actionable under Title VII as a variety
of sex-based discrimination.3 8 In several early decisions, how34. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1984).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1984).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1984). Courts are bound to give deference to these Guidelines. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Robson v. Eva's Super Market, 538 F. Supp. 857,
860 (N.D. Ohio 1982). Cf. Ferguson v. DuPont, 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1197 (D. Del. 1983).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
38. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1981); Tompkins v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044, 1046-49 (3rd Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032
(4th Cir. 1977); Coley v. Consol. Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 646 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Robson v. Eva's Super Market, 538 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Rimedio v. Rev-
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ever, many courts were reluctant to deem sexual harassment actionable under Title VII as a form of sex-based discrimination.3 9
These courts stated that incidents of a sexual nature were not
actionable under Title VII because they were an individual or
personal phenomenon.4" This view, as MacKinnon aptly notes, is
inherently discriminatory:
The ideological and legal function of considering these
matters "personal," as opposed to "sex-based," "reasonable," or "employment-related," is to isolate, individuate,
invalidate and stigmatize women's experience in order to
maintain sexual oppression on the job beyond the reach
of the law. . . .The "personal" life here protected, and
the "natural" law vindicated, is nothing other than men's
traditional prerogative of keeping sexual incursions on
women beyond scrutiny or change.41
In Corne v. Bausch and Lomb,4 2 the District Court for the
District of Arizona refused to uphold a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII. By so doing, the court helped to maintain
sexual oppression on the job. In this case, the plaintiff alleged
that she was subjected to numerous physical and verbal sexual
advances by a supervisor.4 3 The plaintiff claimed that she was
forced to resign because of these advances. The court granted
the employer's motion to dismiss the Title VII action, stating
that "there is nothing in the Act which could reasonably be construed to have it apply to 'verbal and physical sexual advances'
by another employee, even though he be in a supervisory capacity where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to the nature of the employment."4 4 The court also stated:
Ion, Inc., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1205 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Kyriazi v. Western
Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 336 (D. N.J. 1979). See also EEOC Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Regs].
39. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665-66 (1st Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch
and Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 162-64 (D. Ariz. 1975) vacated and remanded mem., 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
40. See supra note 39.
41.

C. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 90.

42. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) vacated and remanded mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th
Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 162.
44. Id. at 163.
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It would be ludicrous to hold that the sort of activity involved here was contemplated by the Act because to do
so would mean that if the conduct complained of was directed equally to males there would be no basis for suit.
Also, an outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit
every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The only sure way an
employer could avoid such charges would be to have employees who were asexual.4 5
Fortunately, the courts have recognized the absurdity of
this view.4 6 In Barnes v. Costle,47 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII as a form of sex-based discrimination.
The court stated that "[i]t is clear that the statutory embargo on
sex discrimination in employment is not confined to differentials
founded wholly upon an employee's gender. On the contrary, it
is enough that gender is a factor contributing to the discrimination in a substantial way."" 8
The Barnes court effectively refuted arguments that a cause
of action under Title VII for sexual harassment cannot be maintained because it is personal in nature. The court stated that,
under Title VII, the employer properly may be held liable for
"the discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel."4 9 This is
so even if only one employee is victimized. The court noted that
"[a] sex-founded impediment to equal employment opportunity
succumbs to Title VII even though less than all employees of the
claimant's gender are affected. The protections afforded by Title
VII against sex discrimination are extended to the individ45. Id. at 163-64.
46. See Niedhart v. D.H. Holmes Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 452, 469-70
(E.D. La. 1979) aff'd mem., 624 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1980); Stringer v. Commonwealth,
446 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Cf. Friend v. Ledinger, 588 F.2d 61, 68 (4th Cir. 1978).
In Niedhart, the court stated that "sexual harassment is a deeply rooted form of sex
discrimination which does operate systematically to deny women equal job opportunity
and equal terms and conditions of employment.
...
21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 46970.
47. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 990.
49. Id. at 993. This is not so where the employer rectifies the conduct, once
discovered.
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"I

The Barnes court also noted that it did not "en-

counter anything to support the notion that employment conditions summoning sexual relations between employees and
superiors are somehow exempted from the coverage of Title
VII.,,5 1

In Barnes, the court was presented with a common factual
situation. The plaintiff was subjected to numerous sexual advances by her supervisor.2 To retaliate for her refusal to accede
to his demands, the supervisor "[blegan a conscious campaign to
belittle [her], to harass [her], and to strip her of her job duties,
all culminating in the decision

. . .

to abolish [her] job in retali-

ation for [her] refusal to grant him sexual favors.""3
In Tomkins v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co.,5 4 the

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was presented with a
similar issue. In Tomkins, the question presented to the court
was "[wihether appellant Adrienne Tomkins, in alleging that her
continued employment with appellee Public Service Electric and
Gas Co. was conditioned on her submitting to the sexual advances of a male supervisor, stated a cause of action under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."1 The court held that a
cognizable claim was indeed stated." To establish the Title VII
claim for sexual harassment, the plaintiff must establish that
"her employer either knowingly or constructively, made acquiescence in her supervisor's sexual demands a necessary prerequisite to the continuation of or advancement in, her job.

'57

In an

50. Id.
51. Id. at 994.
52. See also Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (female
who alleges she was discharged because she rebuffed the sexual advances of a male supervisor states a cause of action under Title VII); Wright v. Methodist Youth Services,
511 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (male employee states a cause of action for
sexual harassment when he is fired after rebuffing the sexual advances of a male
supervisor).
53. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
54. 568 F.2d 1044 (3rd Cir. 1977).
55. Id. at 1045.
56. Id. at 1046.
57. Id. See also Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(the court sets out the elements for a prima facie case of sexual harassment, which include "(1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4)
the harassment complained of affected a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment,
and (5) respondeat superior."). Id. at 647. Accord Hall v. F.O. Thacker Co., 24 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499, 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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action for sexual harassment, the plaintiff must establish a
nexus between the supervisor's sexual demands and her continued employment.5" The Tomkins court stated:
The courts have distinguished between complaints alleging sexual advances of an individual or personal nature
and those alleging direct employment consequences flowing from the advances, finding Title VII violations in the
latter category. This distinction recognizes two elements
necessary to find a violation of Title VII: first, that a
term or condition of employment has been imposed and
second, that it has been imposed by the employer either
directly or vicariously, in a sexually discriminatory
fashion.5 9
The courts have recognized the necessity of establishing a nexus
between the harassment and the plaintiff's employment. This is
because Title VII was designed to protect against artificial barriers to employment, and sexual harassment perpetrated on female employees by supervisors creates "an artificial barrier to
employment . . . placed before one gender and not the
other ... "60
An analysis of the case law teaches that there are several
distinct variations on the cause of action for sexual harassment.
It is important to note, however, that there are also similarities
in each of these variations.
A.

Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor retaliates against an employee for refusing to submit to his sexual
demands.6 1 In quid pro quo cases, the nexus between the unlawful harassment and the employment detriment is clear. The
58.

See id.

59. 568 F.2d at 1048. See also Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 (D. D.C.
1976), motion denied, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 969 (D. D.C. 1976), rev'd in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand

sub nom. Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D. D.C. 1980); Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 66, 71 (E.D. Mich. 1981), later proceeding
547 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Mich. 1982). Accord Regs, supra note 38.
60. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657.
61. See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 42-47.
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courts have uniformly held that "an employer may not exact
62
such consideration from an employee.
In Miller v. Bank of America," the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit dealt with quid pro quo sexual harassment. In
Miller, the plaintiff was fired because she "refused her supervisor's demand for sexual favors from, in his words, 'a black
chick.' "164 The court held that the employer was liable for sexual
harassment under the doctrine of respondeat superior." The
Miller court concluded that "respondeat superior does apply
here, where the action complained of was that of a supervisor,
authorized to hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or recommend such actions, even though what the supervisor is said to have done violates company policy." 66
In Henson v. City of Dundee,6 7 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit discussed quid pro quo sexual harassment and
set out the elements necessary to establish a Title VII claim for
this type of harassment. The elements cited by the court are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The employee belongs to a protected group.
The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment.
The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
The employee's reaction to the harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.6

The court also stated that "[t]he acceptance or rejection of the
harassment by an employee must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause of a tangible
liability. . .. "69
62. Cummings v. Walsh Construction Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 879 (S.D. Ga. 1983). See
also Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 661; Wacks & Starr, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Scope of Employer Liability, 7 EMPL. REL. L.J. 369, 373-74 (1981).

63.
64.
65.
66.
there
67.
68.

600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 212.
Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 213. The employer argued that respondeat superior did not apply because
was an established company policy against the supervisor's actions.
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 909. See also Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 879.

69. 682 F.2d at 909.
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In quid pro quo cases, the plaintiff must show that her refusal to submit to the supervisor's sexual demands caused the
loss of a tangible job benefit. If this can be shown, the employer
will be held strictly liable for the discriminatory actions of the
supervisor.7 0 This strict liability is necessary because there are
strong elements of sexual coercion present in quid pro quo cases.
The Henson court stated that, in quid pro quo cases,
the supervisor relies upon his apparent or actual authority to extort sexual consideration from an employee ...
In that case the supervisor uses the means furnished to
him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose. He acts within the scope of his actual or apparent
authority to "hire, fire, discipline or promote." Because
the supervisor is acting within at least the apparent scope
of the authority entrusted to him by the employer when
he makes employment decisions, his conduct can be
71
fairly imputed to the source of his authority.
In Heelan v. Johns-Mansville Corp.,72 the District Court for
the District of Colorado held that the presentation of the plaintiff's prima facie case of sexual harassment does not terminate
the court's inquiry. 3 The court stated that "[u]nder certain circumstances the employer may be relieved from liability. '74 The
court noted:
[w]here the employer has no knowledge of the discrimination, liability may be avoided if the employer has a
policy or history of discouraging sexual harassment of
employees by supervisors and the employee has failed to
present the matter to a publicized grievance board. If the
employer is aware of the situation and rectifies it, the
70. Regs, supra note 38.
71. 682 F.2d at 910 (citing Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir.
1979) (citations omitted)). See also Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found. Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 98
(5th Cir. 1978).
72. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978) (the court stated that to "present a prima facie
case of sex discrimination by way of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must plead and prove
that (1) submission to sexual advances of a supervisor was a term or condition of employment, (2) this fact substantially affected plaintiff's employment, and (3) employees
of the opposite sex were not affected in the same way by these actions.") Id. at 1389.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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employer may not be held liable for the acts of its
agent.7 5
The mere making of a sexual advance does not constitute the
Title VII violation. The adverse employment consequences to
the victims "is what makes the conduct legally objectionable.""6
Where the plaintiff is unable to establish this employment
nexus, the employer will not be held liable for the sexual advances of its supervisory personnel. 77 In Title VII actions for
sexual harassment, the courts are basically concerned with the
adverse employment effects these advances have on the target
employee.78 In Clark v. World Airways, 79 the court noted this
when it stated that "cases in which sexual harassment has been
held to be actionable under Title VII have normally involved
specific action by the employer in retaliation for rebuffed advances, usually a termination of employment." 0
B.

Sexual Favors Per Se

A sexual favors per se case is presented when the target employee is subjected to requests for sexual favors by either coworkers or supervisors but no retaliatory action is taken when
the employee refuses these advances." ' Often, there is no retaliation in these cases "because the woman acquiesces in the request
for sexual favors . . . or . . .because the person making the advances has no power over the employment status of the female
worker."8' 2 Courts have reached different results in sexual favors
per se cases. Some courts have held that the employer is not
75. Id. See also Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979), Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
76. Heelan, 451 F. Supp. at 1390.
77. See, e.g., Ferguson v. DuPont, 560 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Del. 1983); Walter v. KFGO
Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D. N.D. 1981); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 37 (D. D.C. 1980). "When acquiescence in the sexual advance is not related to
continuation or conditions of employment, such conduct does not constitute sexual discrimination under Title VII." Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 30 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 1645 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
78. Niedhart, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 468.
79. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305 (D. D.C. 1980).
80. Id. at 307.
81. See, e.g., Wacks & Starr, supra note 62, at 375.
82. Id.
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liable because the employment nexus is insufficient.13 In other
cases, the courts have dismissed the complaints of plaintiffs who
cannot show that the employer had either actual or constructive
notice of the harassment. The courts generally hold that the employer cannot be held liable "even if the supervisor does impose
a condition of employment upon a subordinate in a sexually discriminatory fashion, when the employer neither knew about it,
condoned it nor ratified it and, after acquiring knowledge, the
"84
implicated personnel are dealt with appropriately ..
In Bundy v. Jackson,85 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that there was a Title VII violation
"where an employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a result of
the discrimination.""6 In Bundy, the plaintiff had been subjected
to harassment by a supervisor. Although other officials in the
government agency where Bundy worked had notice of the harassment, they neither investigated the charges of harassment
nor attempted to stop it. 7 The Bundy court upheld this cause of
action for sexual harassment under Title VII. The court highlighted the importance of permitting the plaintiff to maintain
this cause of action despite the fact that a less severe employment nexus was presented than would be presented in a quid
pro quo case. The court stated:
[u]nless we extend the Barnes holding, an employer
could sexually harass a female employee with impunity
by carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any other tangible actions against her in response to
her resistance thereby creating the impression . . . that
the employer did not take the ritual of harassment and
resistance "seriously." . . . Indeed, so long as women re83. See, e.g., Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (D.N.D. 1981).
84. Niedhart, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 467. The employer may take actions
that will militate against a finding of actual or constructive notice by establishing that it
either used an external investigatory process after receiving a complaint of sexual harassment or that company policy expressly condemns sexual misconduct. An honest nondiscriminatory investigation must be made once there is a complaint of sexual harassment.
Id. at 469.
85. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 943-44.
87. Id. at 943.

NOTES

1984]

main inferiors in the employment hierarchy, they may
have little recourse against harassment beyond the legal
recourse Bundy seeks in this case."'
In the Bundy case, Judge Wright also noted that "[t]he law may
allow a woman to prove that her resistance to the harassment
cost her her job or some economic benefit. . . . [T]his will do
her no good if the employer never takes such tangible actions
against her." 9 Quoting from MacKinnon, Judge Wright concluded that "this, in turn, means that so long as the sexual situation is constructed with enough coerciveness, subtlety, suddenness, or one-sidedness to negate the effectiveness of the woman's
refusal, or so long as her refusals are simply ignored while her
job is formally undisturbed, she is not considered to have been
sexually harassed." 90
Under the standards enunciated in Bundy, the employer
has an affirmative obligation to take action once informed that
sexual harassment has been perpetrated against an employee by
a supervisor or by other employees. Bundy requires the employer to "investigate complaints of sexual harassment and deal
appropriately with the offending personnel." 91 One court has
noted that a "failure to investigate gives tacit support to the discrimination because the absence of sanctions encourages abusive
behavior."92
The courts have generally given a narrow reading to Bundy,
refusing to hold employers vicariously liable for all acts of sexual
harassment on the part of supervisors and employees. This narrow reading of Bundy is based on the notion that "Title VII is
directed at acts of employment discrimination and not at individual acts of discrimination." 93 Particularly in the sexual favors
per se case, the plaintiff must establish a clear nexus between
these acts of so-called individual discrimination and her employment to avoid a dismissal of the Title VII action.
To avoid liability when confronted with claims of sexual
88.
89.

Id. at 945.
Id.

90. Id. at 945-46. (quoting from C.

MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT

46-47 (1979).)

91. Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
92. Id. In this case, the court refused to hold the employer automatically and vicariously liable for all the discriminatory acts of its agents and supervisors. Id.
93. Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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harassment, it behooves the employer to take some type of action.9 4 If such action is not taken by the employer, the plaintiff
may be able to establish that the harassment was "actively or
tacitly, sanctioned by the employer or constitutes an official policy of the employer." 9 5 The court in Heelan discussed the
greater burden this places on the employer.
If employers have a reason to believe that sexual demands are being made on employees they are obligated
under Title VII to investigate the matter and correct any
violations of law. Moreover, employers must inform employees that management is receptive to such complaints
and if proved true, that management will rectify the situation. If the employer fails to respond to a valid complaint, it effectively condones the illegal acts. 6
C.

The Sexually Offensive Work Environment

The E.E.O.C. Regulations address the problem of the sexually offensive work environment. 7 In the sexually offensive work
environment, sexual harassment is perpetrated against the target employee by other employees. The Regulations state that
"[w]ith respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct unless it can
show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective
action."'9 8
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt with
the problem of the sexually offensive work environment exhaustively in Henson v. City of Dundee.9 In Henson, the court held
that "a hostile or offensive atmosphere created by sexual harassment can, standing alone, constitute a violation of Title
94.
1978).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See, e.g., Heelan v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo.
Ludington, 474 F. Supp. at 483.
451 F. Supp. at 1390.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1984).
Id.
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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VII.....,"1 In Henson, the court set out the elements a plaintiff must establish when stating a cause of action under Title VII
based on the offensive work environment. These elements are
that
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The employee belongs to a protected group.
The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment.
The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
The harassment complained of affected a "term,
condition or privilege of employment."
Respondeat superior. 10 1

In Henson, the court clearly recognized that "[r]epeated, unwarranted and unwelcome verbal and physical conduct of a sexual
nature, requests for sexual favors and sexually derogatory re'10 2
marks clearly may impact on the conditions of employment.
This is regardless of the source of such conduct.
The notion that there may be a violation of Title VII when
the employer permits a sexually offensive environment to be
maintained "stems from the broader problem of employment
discrimination."' 0 3 In Rogers v. E.E.O.C.,0 4 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit stated that "the state of psychological wellbeing is a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the
05
meaning of Title VII.'1
D.

Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment by NonEmployees

In E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp. 06 and in Maranette v.
Michigan Host, Inc. 10 7 employers were held liable under Title
VII for the harassing conduct of non-employees. In both cases,
female employees were required to wear revealing uniforms. In
Sage Realty, the plaintiff, Hasselman, was a lobby attendant in
100. Id. at 902.
101. Id. at 903-05.
102. Rossein, supra note 1, at 291.
103. Allegretti, supra note 1, at 446.
104. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
105. Id. at 238.
106. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
107. 506 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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an office building. She was required to wear an extremely revealing uniform and "received a number of sexual propositions
and endured lewd comments and gestures."'" 8 Although she
complained to management about the fit of the uniform and
about the harassment, management refused to take action. Hasselman ultimately was discharged for refusing to wear the uniform.10 9 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the employer's requirement that the employee
wear the uniform "when he knew that the wearing of this uniform on the job subjected her to sexual harassment, constituted
sex discrimination. . . ."I" The court also stated that "[i]n requiring Hasselman to wear the revealing Bicentennial uniform in
the lobby of 711 Third Avenue, defendants made her acquiescence in sexual harassment by the public, and perhaps by building tenants, a prerequisite of her employment as a lobby attendant.""' In the Maranette case, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan held that female employees of a
cocktail lounge stated a cause of action under Title VII when
they alleged that their employer subjected them to sexual harassment from patrons by requiring them to wear sexually pro2
vocative uniforms."1
These decisions are in accord with the E.E.O.C. Guidelines,
which state that "[aln employer may also be responsible for the
acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action.""'
In an interesting development, the District Court for the
District of Delaware has held that an employer is liable for sexbased discrimination "when sexual favors played a role" in the
decision to promote an employee.11 4 In this case, the plaintiff did
not show that "she refused specific requests by" the supervisor
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 605.
See id.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 609-10.
Maranette, 506 F. Supp. at 910.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1984).
Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1204 (D. Del. 1983).
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for sexual favors and was then denied the position because of
her refusal." 5 Rather, she offered proof that the supervisor had
been sexually involved with the applicant that was selected for
the position." 6 This decision is supported by the E.E.O.C.
Guidelines, which provide that "[w]here employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's submission
to the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors,
the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination
against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit."'1 7 It is not entirely clear, however, that this situation does in fact constitute sexual
harassment.
IV.

MAINTAINING THE CAUSE OF ACTION

Although the case law has established that the target of sexual harassment may maintain an action under Title VII, 118 it is
difficult for a plaintiff to prevail in an action for sexual harassment because problems arise in proving a prima facie case.
The plaintiff must first establish that she belongs to a protected group, namely, that she is a member of a group that Title
VII was designed to protect." 9 This requirement is reasonably
straightforward because Title VII was designed, in part, to pro120
tect women from discrimination on the job.
The plaintiff must then establish that she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment.' 2 ' In Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc.,'2 2 an action for sexual harassment was dismissed by
the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan because
115. Id. at 1403.
116. Id.
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1984).
118. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Katz
v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Evans v. National Post Office Mail Handler's
Union, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634 (D. D.C. 1983); Martin v. Norbar, Inc., 537
F. Supp. 1260 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
119. See Henson, 682 F.2d 897.
120. In some cases, the courts have permitted sexual harassment actions to be maintained by men. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill.
1981). Cf. Heubschen v. Department of Health and Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th
Cir. 1983).
121. See Henson, 682 F.2d 897.
122. 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,379 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
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the evidence presented indicated that "the allegedly- harassing
conduct was substantially welcomed and encouraged by plaintiff," and that "[s]he actively contributed to the distasteful
working environment by her own profane and sexually suggestive conduct. ' 123 Clearly, the particular facts presented in each
case will determine whether the harassment is unwelcome. It has
been stated that
[n]ot every unwelcome sexual advance, however, constitutes a violation of Title VII. For example, a mere flirtation has been held insufficient because such an incident
fails to establish the requisite showing that "submission
to the sexual suggestion constitutes a term or condition
of employment." Furthermore, sexually aggressive conduct and explicit conversation on the part of the Plaintiff
24
may bar a cause of action for sexual harassment.
The third element of the prima facie case is that the harassment
complained of is based on the plaintiff's gender. 125 In order to
establish this element, the plaintiff must establish that the harassment "was perpetrated because she was a female, as [it was]
not directed towards male employees.' 26 In Cummings v. Walsh
Construction Co.,' 27 the District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia noted that a Title VII action for sexual harassment
could not be maintained "if the impugned conduct is directed to
both sexes and is equally offensive.' 128 The plaintiff must show
that, but for her gender, the activity complained of would not
have occurred.' 29 The case law indicates that a male plaintiff will
meet this criterion if he is harassed by female co-workers or
3
supervisors.'1
123. Id. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Ukarish v.
Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D. N.J. 1983); Evans v.
National Post Office Mail Handler's Union, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634 (D. D.C.
1983).
124. Ferguson v. DuPont, 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1197 (D. Del. 1983) (quoting Heelan v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo. 1974) (citations omitted)).
125. Henson, 682 F.2d 897.
126. Cummings v. Walsh Construction Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 877 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 877. See also Regs, supra note 38.
129. See, e.g., Regs, supra note 38.
130. See, e.g., Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill.
1981). Cf. Heubschen v. Dep't. of Health and Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir.
1983).

1984]

NOTES

The plaintiff must then establish a nexus between the sexual harassment complained of and her employment."' To show
that a term, condition, or privilege of employment was affected
as a result of the sexual harassment, the plaintiff must prove
that the activities complained of were "sufficiently pervasive and
severe to alter her working conditions by affecting her psychological well-being."'1 2 The district court will dismiss the Title
VII complaint if a nexus between the atmosphere of the work
place and the plaintiff's employment cannot be established. For
example, if the plaintiff was forced to quit her job, the plaintiff
was denied a transfer or promotion, or the psychic atmosphere
in the work place was extremely poor, the complaint will not be
dismissed.' 33
3
1 the Court of Appeals for the DisIn Bundy v. Jackson,1
trict of Columbia Circuit noted that the terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment include more than the loss of tangible
job benefits. The court noted that "'conditions of employment'
include the psychological and emotional work environment-that the sexual stereotypes, insults, and demeaning propositions" may cause "anxiety and debilitation" and "illegally
poison . . . the environment." '3 5 To avoid having her action dismissed, the plaintiff must either have evidence that the conduct
alleged to constitute sexual harassment altered the conditions of
her employment or that it created an abusive working
environment.' 3 6
The final element to be established by the plaintiff is respondeat superior.3 7 The plaintiff must present evidence that
"[t]he harassment was either actively or constructively known
131. Henson, 682 F.2d 897.
132. Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 877. To establish this element of the Title VII claim
the plaintiff must establish that "the working atmosphere is so pervaded by persistent
and severe harassment that the complainant's psychological well-being is affected . ...
[P]roof of a tangible job detriment is not required to succeed on a claim." Id. at 878.
8698
133. See, e.g., Smith v. Rust Engineering Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
(N.D. Ala. 1978).
134. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 943-44. The court relies on Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
136. Evans v. National Post Office Mail Handler's Union, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 634, 638 (D. D.C. 1983).
137. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905, 909.
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by the employer who failed to take prompt remedial action.' ' 38
One way to establish the applicability of respondeat superior is
to present evidence of harassment so widespread and common
among the defendant's personnel that constructive knowledge of
the behavior can be inferred.' 3 In the Cummings case, the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia stated that the
"fact that an employer may have a policy prohibiting sexual harassment is of little significance if prompt remedial action is not
taken."' 4 The E.E.O.C. Guidelines provide that
[a]n employer, employment agency, joint apprenticeship
committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and
those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the
employer knew or should have known of their
4
occurrence.1 '
However salutory, the Guidelines have not met with universal acceptance in this respect by the district courts. 1 42 In Ferguson v. DuPont, 43 the District Court for the District of Delaware
refused to follow the Guidelines, and explained:
I believe the better rule is that of requiring actual or constructive knowledge before liability can be imposed in a
hostile environment case on the basis of the fact sub
judice. The E.E.O.C. Guidelines [impose] too onerous of
a burden and employers should not be liable if they seek
to alleviate or dispel hostile environments by methods
such as strict and prompt remedial measures and strictly
enforced and well-known company policies. Further,
when supervisory personnel engage in such activity, they
138. Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 877. See also Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 (employer was
not held liable because it was not aware of the harassment).
139. 561 F. Supp. at 877.
140. Id. at 878.
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1982).
142. See, e.g., Ferguson v. DuPont, 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1198 (D. Del. 1983) (the court
required actual or constructive notice before imposing liability).
143. Id.
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act outside the scope of their authority and agency prin144
ciples, therefore, do not apply.
The view of the Ferguson court notwithstanding, strict liability should be applied. Sexual harassment places an onerous
burden on the target employee. Furthermore, when supervisory
personnel engage in the harassment, they do so under color of
authority. Because the burden of this outrageous conduct falls so
disproportionately on the target employees, Title VII must be
used as a tool to coerce reluctant employers to take affirmative
45
steps to discourage sexual harassment.'
Respondeat superior may be applied when the plaintiff establishes that higher authorities were notified that harassment
was occurring.' 46 Once notified, the employer is placed under an
affirmative obligation to make certain that the harassment is
stopped.' 47 Appropriate action to take would necessarily include
investigating the complaint, and if the harassment charge is
found to have merit, taking such other steps as are mandated by
the circumstances. This would include firing the offending employees or taking other disciplinary action against them. 4 s
It is important to note that "no employer can guarantee its
employees a work place free of all insult and harassment.' ' 149 Especially in cases of co-worker harassment, the case law merely
requires that the employer "do what it can to eliminate harassment when management knows of it."' 5 An employer may not
144. Id. at 1199.
145. See generally C. MACKINNON, supra note 2.
146. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905, 907; accord Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D. N.J. 1983) (employer in this case was not notified of
harassment, which was one of the reasons given by the court, citing Henson, to deny the
claim).
147. Bundy, 641 F.2d 947; see also Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1627, 1633 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (employer, police department, held liable
under Title VII under a theory of constructive discharge when the Chief of Police failed
to investigate the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment by her immediate supervisor as
well as by other employees. This failure on the part of the employer is the crux of its
liability in this case).
148. See e.g., Siniscalo, Sexual Harassment and Employer Liability: The Flirtation
that Could Cost a Fortune, 6 EMPL. REL. L.J. 369, 386 (1981); COMMISSION, supra note 1,
at 15. Suggestions to employers to avoid liability include "a clear company policy against
sexual harassment, and a clear program for combating harassment if it occurs." Wacks &
Starr, supra note 62, at 386.
149. Allegretti, supra note 1, at 454.
150. Id.
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tolerate sexual harassment perpetrated either by co-workers or
by supervisors.15 ' A policy against sexual harassment on the part
of the employer is not sufficient to escape liability. Once made
aware that sexual harassment is occurring, the employer must
take affirmative steps to make certain that it is stopped.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Incidents of sexual harassment do not occur in a vacuum.
They are part of a series of interactions between the target employee and the harasser(s). "Risque jokes, double entendres, and
graphic sexual descriptions can all be a frequent aspect of some
departments and some working relationships."' 5 3 Not all of this
will, in every instance, constitute sexual harassment. On one
level, sexual harassment is merely a judgment by an employee
that the conduct directed towards her is uncalled for and unbearable. 54 One observer has cogently noted that:
What makes one person angry and insulted may amuse
or mildly irritate someone else. One woman may not even
notice that the boss constantly calls the women in the
office "sweetie" or "cutie," while another will feel the
hair on the back of her neck bristle every time he does it.
Part of the difference is in the values brought to the
55
judgment of this behavior.1
The Title VII action for sexual harassment provides protection "in cases of persistent and severe harassment.' 156 Not every
incident is persistent and severe. It is up to the employee in
many instances to determine whether she is overreacting to an
innocent flirtation and, if not, to confront the harasser and let
him know that his behavior is not acceptable. Only after this
avenue has been exhausted should the target employee pursue
more drastic remedies. The courts should be a last resort. In151. Id. at 461. See also Regs, supra note 38; Martin v. Norbar, Inc., 537 F. Supp.
1260 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Price v. Lawhorn Furniture Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8342
(N.D. Ala. 1978); Munford v. J.T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
152. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983).
153. M. MEYER, supra note 7, at 69.
154. Id. at 72.
155. Id.
156. Allegretti, supra note 1, at 461.
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house remedies such as reporting the incident(s) to a supervisor
should be used before any lawsuit is filed. The case law indicates
that if the target employee is unable to show actual or constructive knowledge of harassment on the part of the employer the
case will be dismissed. The most effective way to establish notice
is to complain about the harasser(s) to management.
Daniel Leach, an E.E.O.C. Vice-Chairman, has stated that
the Guidelines were promulgated "so that employers can rely on
those judgments. And if they choose they can voluntarily comply
with the law rather than wait for a government agency to enforce the law against them-which would cost them a lot of
money."' 57 Leach has also indicated that:
[tihe guidelines have alerted employers that there are
things that they can do on their own to limit their liability in sexual harassment cases. "We've said [to employers:] set up your own in-house machinery . . . make it
credible so that when a complaint is filed by a woman
who believes she has been sexually harassed, there is an
investigation. Then there is a sense among employees
that the investigation has integrity and if there is a finding that someone in the line of authority is at fault that
there is going to be some kind of disciplinary action
taken.", 58
The E.E.O.C. Guidelines and the case law expresses the
"outer parameters of Title VII."' 59 Generally, behavior that can
be categorized as sexual harassment must be relatively obscene.
Behavior that is merely obnoxious or flirtatious is usually not
defined as constituting sexual harassment by the courts. The
target employee may not participate in the harassing behavior
nor may she file a Title VII claim before complaining to her employer about the harassment. Once made aware of the harassment, the employer has an affirmative obligation to take reasonable steps to make certain that its employees work in an
atmosphere free from harassment. Such steps include firing the
offending employees.' 60 In Snipes v. United States Postal Ser157.
158.
159.
160.

BNA Report, supra note 5, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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vice, 6 ' a foreman was fired for engaging in incidents of sexual
harassment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld
the termination stating that "[tihe agency has an obligation to
its employees to create and maintain a work environment free of
1 62
sexual harassment.
The problem of sexual harassment in the work place is an
important one. It transcends the economic and political. Rather,
as one commentator has aptly noted, sexual harassment is a basic "indecent, inhuman indignity" which society must refuse to
accept.1 3
Helen D. Rosen

161.
162.
163.

677 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1258.
BNA Report, supra note 5, at 32.

